On Tue, 17 Jul 2007 09:44:18 GMT, Dutch wrote:
On Tue, 17 Jul 2007 10:07:32 +0100, irate wrote:
On Tue, 17 Jul 2007 01:23:12 GMT, Dutch wrote:
irate vegan wrote:
On Mon, 16 Jul 2007 20:00:10 GMT, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 7:37 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your
criticisms of it are unsatisfactory.
Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a
convincing argument.
I would also add that that essay, moralstat99.doc, which you like so
much, endorses this argument of mine. I showed where in the thread
"The myth of food production efficiency...", in conversation with Ball.
Are you referring to the suggestion that we may have a prima facie moral
obligation to consume a vegetarian diet?
No, of course not. Here is the quote.
"When we affirm that some objects have inherent value while others
do not, we treat them differently with regard to moral status. If this
differential treatment is to be sound and not arbitrary, it must be
justifiable by some relevant difference. This requirement is warranted
by the Principle of Formal Equality which can hardly be avoided if we
are to think consistently in practical matters. Presumably, the best
way of formulating this principle is as follows: Cases which are
relevantly similar, should be treated in a similar manner; a
differential treatment requires a relevant difference.
Applied to the question of moral status, this should be spelled out as
follows: If we ascribe moral status to some objects and not to others,
the first objects must have some relevant property to the required
degree, and the other objects must lack this property, or at least
not have it to the degree required. If this property is a necessary
condition for moral status, its absence in other objects will be a
sufficient condition for denying moral status to them; while if it is
only a sufficient condition, it must be lacking in other objects, and
they must have no other properties in addition which are sufficient
conditions for being ascribed moral status."
The author goes on to lay the groundwork for his conclusion
By denying the antecedent, no less.
Exactly right.
No, exactly wrong, grossly incorrect. The groundwork is rigorous
philosophical argument.
I've shown where he denies the antecedent to get his point
accepted, which is anything but "rigorous philosophical
argument."
14 pages later, on page 20, as follows:
"The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings, which
can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription of
moral status.
Ipse dixit and false. The author must define what this "relevant
differences" is, AND that it justifies disrespectful treatment.
Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably
the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is accepted
to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status,
1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have
moral status.
then its absence in other animals
2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency
will be a sufficient condition for denying moral status to them."
Therefore (3) they have no moral status.
Any argument that denies the antecedent to gain acceptance
must always be rejected as specious.
1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have
moral status.
2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency
therefore
3) they have no moral status.
or
1) If a, then c
2) Not a
therefore
3) not c
All bullshit.
No, it's a simple syllogism to show where the author denies
the antecedent to get his point accepted.
He doesn't
I've shown that he does. There's no getting away from it.
Moral agency and moral status are not one and the same.
I'm not saying they are.
You're barking up the wrong tree.
Not at all. Moral agents are distinct from moral patients
as lawmakers capable of enduring the consequences of
their wrong actions.
What I'm saying is that a lack of
moral agency doesn't show a lack of moral status.
He doesn't say that it does.
Yes, he says exactly that by writing,
"Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably
the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is
accepted to be a necessary condition for the ascription of
moral status, then its absence in other animals will be a
sufficient condition for denying moral status to them."
Beings
can still have moral status without having moral agency.
The author concedes this by writing,
Of course he concedes it.
No, he doesn't. What he does is deny them moral status
on the basis that they lack moral agency, but he then goes
on to contradict himself in the following passage below this
paragraph by elevating primates to moral persons.
"Theoretically, there might be other moral persons also,
but there seem to be none, excepting perhaps some of
our closest relatives among the primates."
I then wrote,
"It follows, then, that apes hold rights due to his fact that
they "are moral persons.""
and you replied,
"Possibly. I would hold in fact that this is so plausible that
apes should be granted basic rights."
Dutch 7 July 2007 http://tinyurl.com/328k8h
Yes, all reasonable..
Then, not only does the author fail to debunk the argument
from marginal cases, he ascribes rights to non-human animals
by elevating them to rights-holding moral persons, and you
agree with him.
The capacity for moral agency is the basis for full moral status.
You've moved the goalposts from "moral status" to "full moral
status"
I haven't moved the goalposts
I've shown that you have. You initially started out with "moral
persons" and then widened the goalposts to "*full* moral
persons." That's a perfect "shifting the goalposts" example.
but that effort still doesn't explain how a lack in moral
agency demonstrates a lack in moral status.
The capacity for moral agency is the high water mark of sentience, it
is a part of the set of higher cognitive functions which set humans
apart from all other species.
Even if true, it still doesn't follow that beings with a lesser
cognitive ability than ours have no moral status, and that
our higher cognitive abilities somehow justifies using them
as tools in the laboratory and farmed foods.
"Animals can be "moral patients", in a similar
way as minor children or people in comas.
They can hold rights against us, but we can't
hold rights against them."
Dutch 24 Sep 2005 http://tinyurl.com/cpxhx
I'm going to tell you this once, stop the nonsense of dragging up
quotes from years ago or I'll just ignore you.
Your quotes which advocate rights for animals are past
and present, and I shall continue to bring them here to
show that you're an immoral, lying imbecile. Why do you
advocate rights for animals while advocating that they be
farmed and slaughtered for nothing more than your taste
for meat? Why do you promote vivisection on them while
knowing them to be rights-holders? If animals hold any
rights against us at all, the minimum must be to be spared
the maximum of all possible wrongs.