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Old 09-09-2004, 01:27 AM
Bill Oliver
 
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In article ixM%c.160007$mD.94478@attbi_s02,
Warren wrote:


I think you need to get a grip. Doctrine that there were tanks? Talk
about reaching.


Yes. Soviet military doctrine was tank heavy. It's not reaching, its
basic military history.

From Soviet Military Doctrine by William Odom, Foreign Affairs,
Winter 1988/89:

Soviet ground forces are composed of more than two hundred
divisions, all mechanized, and organized under army, front and high
commands in at least five theaters of military operations. They
possess more than 53,000 main battle tanks, 48,000 tubes of
artillery, mortars and multiple-rocket launchers, 4,600
surface-to-air missiles and 4,500 helicopters.


You see the "all mechanized" part? That means tanks and armored
personnel carriers and the like. It means that if there
were any troops at all, there were tanks around. And with 40,000
troops, doctrine would have dictated *lots* of tanks. That has pretty
much always been Soviet doctrine since WWII. Soviet doctrine was
very similar to that of the Nazis -- focusing on mobility and surprise,
for which the tank was the main and indispensible tool, barely
giving way to the strategic rocket forces and the use of the helicopter
as an artillery platform. The emphasis on tanks by Saddam in the
first Gulf War was because he used Soviet doctrine. This shift
toward tanks started in the 30s and continued through the 60s.

As noted by Fionn Kelly at
http://www.combatmission.com/article.../sov_part1.asp

At the beginning of August 1931, the government endorsed a plan for
the build-up of the RKKA over the period 1931-1933. Simultaneously,
on August 1, 1931, the Council for Labour and Defence accepted the
so-called "Great Tank Programme". This arose from the fact that
"technical achievements in the field of tank construction in the
USSR create a sound basis for radical alterations to the universal
operative-tactical doctrines in the employment of tanks and
necessitate decisive organizational changes to the armoured-tank
troops in respect of the creation of superior mechanised formations,
capable as much of solving tasks on the battlefield as also in the
entire operative depth of a modern combat front. The new
high-mobility material of the units provide the basis for
elaborating the theories of battles and operations in depth" (M. N.
Tukhachevsky).

As noted by Jonathan R. Adelman in The EVOLUTION OF SOVIET MILITARY
DOCTRINE, 1945-84


... Airborne, tank, and
motorized forces gained prominence at the expense of the infantry.
The Strategic Rocket Forces replaced the ground forces as the
dominant armed service by the early 1960s. Major General V. G.
Reznichenko and Colonel A. Sidorenko clarified the changing nature
of warfare during this period when they declared:

There will also be a different way of breaking through the
enemy's defense. The method used will no longer be that of
"gnawing through" as was the case in past wars. The defense
will be dealt nuclear strikes and will then be attacked from
the line of march, at high tempo, by tanks and mechanized
troops. The use of nuclear weapons will create favorable
conditions for the rapid advance of troops. They should be able
to utilize quickly the results of nuclear weapons, penetrate
boldly through breaches in the enemy's combat formations, avoid
both frontal attack on strong points and straight line
movements, carry out flexible maneuvers, and deal decisive
blows to the enemy's flank and rear.


Reaching? Hardly.

You could make the claim that instead of a main battle tank,
Schwarzenneger saw an armored personnel carrier -- which would be a
reasonable mistake for a child to make -- but that would not carry
water for the politics of personal destruction of which you Dems are so
fond.

billo