On Jul 16, 7:37 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your criticisms
of it are unsatisfactory.
Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a
convincing argument.

I would also add that that essay, moralstat99.doc, which you like so
much, endorses this argument of mine. I showed where in the thread
"The myth of food production efficiency...", in conversation with Ball.

Are you referring to the suggestion that we may have a prima facie moral
obligation to consume a vegetarian diet?

No, of course not. Here is the quote.

"When we affirm that some objects have inherent value while others do
not, we treat them differently with regard to moral status. If this
differential treatment is to be sound and not arbitrary, it must be
justifiable by some relevant difference. This requirement is
warranted
by the Principle of Formal Equality which can hardly be avoided if we
are to think consistently in practical matters. Presumably, the best
way of formulating this principle is as follows: Cases which are
relevantly similar, should be treated in a similar manner; a
differential treatment requires a relevant difference.


Applied to the question of moral status, this should be spelled out
as
follows: If we ascribe moral status to some objects and not to
others,
the first objects must have some relevant property to the required
degree, and the other objects must lack this property, or at least
not
have it to the degree required. If this property is a necessary
condition for moral status, its absence in other objects will be a
sufficient condition for denying moral status to them; while if it is
only a sufficient condition, it must be lacking in other objects, and
they must have no other properties in addition which are sufficient
conditions for being ascribed moral status."