irate vegan wrote:
On Mon, 16 Jul 2007 20:00:10 GMT, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 7:37 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your
criticisms of it are unsatisfactory.
Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a
convincing argument.
I would also add that that essay, moralstat99.doc, which you like so
much, endorses this argument of mine. I showed where in the thread
"The myth of food production efficiency...", in conversation with Ball.
Are you referring to the suggestion that we may have a prima facie moral
obligation to consume a vegetarian diet?
No, of course not. Here is the quote.
Thank you

"When we affirm that some objects have inherent value while others
do not, we treat them differently with regard to moral status. If this
differential treatment is to be sound and not arbitrary, it must be
justifiable by some relevant difference. This requirement is warranted
by the Principle of Formal Equality which can hardly be avoided if we
are to think consistently in practical matters. Presumably, the best
way of formulating this principle is as follows: Cases which are
relevantly similar, should be treated in a similar manner; a
differential treatment requires a relevant difference.

Applied to the question of moral status, this should be spelled out as
follows: If we ascribe moral status to some objects and not to others,
the first objects must have some relevant property to the required
degree, and the other objects must lack this property, or at least
not have it to the degree required. If this property is a necessary
condition for moral status, its absence in other objects will be a
sufficient condition for denying moral status to them; while if it is
only a sufficient condition, it must be lacking in other objects, and
they must have no other properties in addition which are sufficient
conditions for being ascribed moral status."
The author goes on to lay the groundwork for his conclusion

By denying the antecedent, no less.

14 pages later, on page 20, as follows:

"The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings, which
can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription of
moral status.

Ipse dixit and false. The author must define what this "relevant
differences" is, AND that it justifies disrespectful treatment.

Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably
the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is accepted
to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status,

1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have
moral status.

then its absence in other animals

2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency

will be a sufficient condition for denying moral status to them."

Therefore (3) they have no moral status.

Any argument that denies the antecedent to gain acceptance
must always be rejected as specious.

1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have
moral status.
2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency
therefore
3) they have no moral status.

or

1) If a, then c
2) Not a
therefore
3) not c

All bullshit. Moral agency and moral status are not one and the same.
The capacity for moral agency is the basis for full moral status.