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Now even spiders, squid and lobsters could have rights, and about time too!
On Tue, 17 Jul 2007 10:07:32 +0100, irate vegan
wrote: On Tue, 17 Jul 2007 01:23:12 GMT, Dutch wrote: irate vegan wrote: On Mon, 16 Jul 2007 20:00:10 GMT, Dutch wrote: Rupert wrote: On Jul 16, 7:37 pm, Dutch wrote: Rupert wrote: On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote: Rupert wrote: I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your criticisms of it are unsatisfactory. Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a convincing argument. I would also add that that essay, moralstat99.doc, which you like so much, endorses this argument of mine. I showed where in the thread "The myth of food production efficiency...", in conversation with Ball. Are you referring to the suggestion that we may have a prima facie moral obligation to consume a vegetarian diet? No, of course not. Here is the quote. "When we affirm that some objects have inherent value while others do not, we treat them differently with regard to moral status. If this differential treatment is to be sound and not arbitrary, it must be justifiable by some relevant difference. This requirement is warranted by the Principle of Formal Equality which can hardly be avoided if we are to think consistently in practical matters. Presumably, the best way of formulating this principle is as follows: Cases which are relevantly similar, should be treated in a similar manner; a differential treatment requires a relevant difference. Applied to the question of moral status, this should be spelled out as follows: If we ascribe moral status to some objects and not to others, the first objects must have some relevant property to the required degree, and the other objects must lack this property, or at least not have it to the degree required. If this property is a necessary condition for moral status, its absence in other objects will be a sufficient condition for denying moral status to them; while if it is only a sufficient condition, it must be lacking in other objects, and they must have no other properties in addition which are sufficient conditions for being ascribed moral status." The author goes on to lay the groundwork for his conclusion By denying the antecedent, no less. Exactly right. No, exactly wrong, grossly incorrect. The groundwork is rigorous philosophical argument. 14 pages later, on page 20, as follows: "The second consequence which follows from this position is that there will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings, which can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription of moral status. Ipse dixit and false. The author must define what this "relevant differences" is, AND that it justifies disrespectful treatment. Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is accepted to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status, 1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have moral status. then its absence in other animals 2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency will be a sufficient condition for denying moral status to them." Therefore (3) they have no moral status. Any argument that denies the antecedent to gain acceptance must always be rejected as specious. 1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have moral status. 2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency therefore 3) they have no moral status. or 1) If a, then c 2) Not a therefore 3) not c All bullshit. No, it's a simple syllogism to show where the author denies the antecedent to get his point accepted. He doesn't, you're completely off the rails. He states that the capacity for moral agency is what sets humans apart from all other species, and that capacity is what entitles humans to special moral status. Moral agency and moral status are not one and the same. I'm not saying they are. You're barking up the wrong tree. What I'm saying is that a lack of moral agency doesn't show a lack of moral status. He doesn't say that it does. Beings can still have moral status without having moral agency. The author concedes this by writing, Of course he concedes it. You just erected a strawman and attacked it. "Theoretically, there might be other moral persons also, but there seem to be none, excepting perhaps some of our closest relatives among the primates." I then wrote, "It follows, then, that apes hold rights due to his fact that they "are moral persons."" and you replied, "Possibly. I would hold in fact that this is so plausible that apes should be granted basic rights." Dutch 7 July 2007 http://tinyurl.com/328k8h Yes, all reasonable.. The capacity for moral agency is the basis for full moral status. You've moved the goalposts from "moral status" to "full moral status" I haven't moved the goalposts, I have always held that animals possess moral status. In moralstat99 he argues that all organisms possess some moral status depending on the degree of sentience of the species. Humans, with the highest degree of sentience/intelligence enjoy the highest moral status. Microscopic animals with the lowest, enjoy the least. This is a completely plausible idea. but that effort still doesn't explain how a lack in moral agency demonstrates a lack in moral status. The capacity for moral agency is the high water mark of sentience, it is a part of the set of higher cognitive functions which set humans apart from all other species. "Animals can be "moral patients", in a similar way as minor children or people in comas. They can hold rights against us, but we can't hold rights against them." Dutch 24 Sep 2005 http://tinyurl.com/cpxhx I'm going to tell you this once, stop the nonsense of dragging up quotes from years ago or I'll just ignore you. I don't have the patience to indulge your rubbish. If you are incapable of carrying on a contemporaneous discussion then signal that by continuing the practice and I'll just killfile you and your sock puppets. |
#2
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Now even spiders, squid and lobsters could have rights, and about time too!
On Tue, 17 Jul 2007 09:44:18 GMT, Dutch wrote:
On Tue, 17 Jul 2007 10:07:32 +0100, irate wrote: On Tue, 17 Jul 2007 01:23:12 GMT, Dutch wrote: irate vegan wrote: On Mon, 16 Jul 2007 20:00:10 GMT, Dutch wrote: Rupert wrote: On Jul 16, 7:37 pm, Dutch wrote: Rupert wrote: On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote: Rupert wrote: I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your criticisms of it are unsatisfactory. Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a convincing argument. I would also add that that essay, moralstat99.doc, which you like so much, endorses this argument of mine. I showed where in the thread "The myth of food production efficiency...", in conversation with Ball. Are you referring to the suggestion that we may have a prima facie moral obligation to consume a vegetarian diet? No, of course not. Here is the quote. "When we affirm that some objects have inherent value while others do not, we treat them differently with regard to moral status. If this differential treatment is to be sound and not arbitrary, it must be justifiable by some relevant difference. This requirement is warranted by the Principle of Formal Equality which can hardly be avoided if we are to think consistently in practical matters. Presumably, the best way of formulating this principle is as follows: Cases which are relevantly similar, should be treated in a similar manner; a differential treatment requires a relevant difference. Applied to the question of moral status, this should be spelled out as follows: If we ascribe moral status to some objects and not to others, the first objects must have some relevant property to the required degree, and the other objects must lack this property, or at least not have it to the degree required. If this property is a necessary condition for moral status, its absence in other objects will be a sufficient condition for denying moral status to them; while if it is only a sufficient condition, it must be lacking in other objects, and they must have no other properties in addition which are sufficient conditions for being ascribed moral status." The author goes on to lay the groundwork for his conclusion By denying the antecedent, no less. Exactly right. No, exactly wrong, grossly incorrect. The groundwork is rigorous philosophical argument. I've shown where he denies the antecedent to get his point accepted, which is anything but "rigorous philosophical argument." 14 pages later, on page 20, as follows: "The second consequence which follows from this position is that there will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings, which can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription of moral status. Ipse dixit and false. The author must define what this "relevant differences" is, AND that it justifies disrespectful treatment. Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is accepted to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status, 1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have moral status. then its absence in other animals 2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency will be a sufficient condition for denying moral status to them." Therefore (3) they have no moral status. Any argument that denies the antecedent to gain acceptance must always be rejected as specious. 1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have moral status. 2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency therefore 3) they have no moral status. or 1) If a, then c 2) Not a therefore 3) not c All bullshit. No, it's a simple syllogism to show where the author denies the antecedent to get his point accepted. He doesn't I've shown that he does. There's no getting away from it. Moral agency and moral status are not one and the same. I'm not saying they are. You're barking up the wrong tree. Not at all. Moral agents are distinct from moral patients as lawmakers capable of enduring the consequences of their wrong actions. What I'm saying is that a lack of moral agency doesn't show a lack of moral status. He doesn't say that it does. Yes, he says exactly that by writing, "Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is accepted to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status, then its absence in other animals will be a sufficient condition for denying moral status to them." Beings can still have moral status without having moral agency. The author concedes this by writing, Of course he concedes it. No, he doesn't. What he does is deny them moral status on the basis that they lack moral agency, but he then goes on to contradict himself in the following passage below this paragraph by elevating primates to moral persons. "Theoretically, there might be other moral persons also, but there seem to be none, excepting perhaps some of our closest relatives among the primates." I then wrote, "It follows, then, that apes hold rights due to his fact that they "are moral persons."" and you replied, "Possibly. I would hold in fact that this is so plausible that apes should be granted basic rights." Dutch 7 July 2007 http://tinyurl.com/328k8h Yes, all reasonable.. Then, not only does the author fail to debunk the argument from marginal cases, he ascribes rights to non-human animals by elevating them to rights-holding moral persons, and you agree with him. The capacity for moral agency is the basis for full moral status. You've moved the goalposts from "moral status" to "full moral status" I haven't moved the goalposts I've shown that you have. You initially started out with "moral persons" and then widened the goalposts to "*full* moral persons." That's a perfect "shifting the goalposts" example. but that effort still doesn't explain how a lack in moral agency demonstrates a lack in moral status. The capacity for moral agency is the high water mark of sentience, it is a part of the set of higher cognitive functions which set humans apart from all other species. Even if true, it still doesn't follow that beings with a lesser cognitive ability than ours have no moral status, and that our higher cognitive abilities somehow justifies using them as tools in the laboratory and farmed foods. "Animals can be "moral patients", in a similar way as minor children or people in comas. They can hold rights against us, but we can't hold rights against them." Dutch 24 Sep 2005 http://tinyurl.com/cpxhx I'm going to tell you this once, stop the nonsense of dragging up quotes from years ago or I'll just ignore you. Your quotes which advocate rights for animals are past and present, and I shall continue to bring them here to show that you're an immoral, lying imbecile. Why do you advocate rights for animals while advocating that they be farmed and slaughtered for nothing more than your taste for meat? Why do you promote vivisection on them while knowing them to be rights-holders? If animals hold any rights against us at all, the minimum must be to be spared the maximum of all possible wrongs. |
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