Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your criticisms
of it are unsatisfactory.
Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a
convincing argument.


I would also add that that essay, moralstat99.doc, which you like so
much, endorses this argument of mine. I showed where in the thread
"The myth of food production efficiency...", in conversation with Ball.


Are you referring to the suggestion that we may have a prima facie moral
obligation to consume a vegetarian diet?

On Jul 16, 7:31 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your criticisms
of it are unsatisfactory.
Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a
convincing argument.

There's more to it than that. I've elaborated on why the burden of
proof lies where I claim it does.

You've done no such thing. You (and DeGrazia) can't support your
assertions so you attempt to force others to supply proof of the
contrary, its the oldest trick in the book. If you expect for one single
moment that such a tactic is going to meet with any success you are
dreaming. All it does is show to everyone that your position cannot be
argued on its merits.


I've explained exactly why the burden of proof lies where it does.
Those who judge two different cases differently have to supply a
morally relevant difference between the two cases. The burden is on
them to show that the morally relevant difference exists. If this
weren't so, there would have been no way to argue for the emancipation
of black people. The author of the essay you admire so much, and every
other serious scholar in animal ethics, would agree with me. Those who
want to argue that being human gives you a special moral status have
to explain why. Some think it can be done, some can't.

To say DeGrazia does not support his assertions is palpable nonsense.
As you said to Derek, you're not evaluating the text honestly.

You can deny it all you want, but there's an argument here that has to
be seriously engaged with, and none of you are doing that.

Ball's alternative account of where
the burden of proof lies has serious problems, which I have explained.
He has given no satisfactory response.

I've provided a coherent point of view which refutes the argument from
marginal cases. It lays out a solid foundation which explains rights and
our relationship with animals.

You've given someone else's attempted rebuttal of the argument from
marginal cases, which we've talked about a bit and we'll talk about
some more.

On Jul 16, 7:37 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your criticisms
of it are unsatisfactory.
Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a
convincing argument.

I would also add that that essay, moralstat99.doc, which you like so
much, endorses this argument of mine. I showed where in the thread
"The myth of food production efficiency...", in conversation with Ball.

Are you referring to the suggestion that we may have a prima facie moral
obligation to consume a vegetarian diet?

No, of course not. Here is the quote.

"When we affirm that some objects have inherent value while others do
not, we treat them differently with regard to moral status. If this
differential treatment is to be sound and not arbitrary, it must be
justifiable by some relevant difference. This requirement is
warranted
by the Principle of Formal Equality which can hardly be avoided if we
are to think consistently in practical matters. Presumably, the best
way of formulating this principle is as follows: Cases which are
relevantly similar, should be treated in a similar manner; a
differential treatment requires a relevant difference.


Applied to the question of moral status, this should be spelled out
as
follows: If we ascribe moral status to some objects and not to
others,
the first objects must have some relevant property to the required
degree, and the other objects must lack this property, or at least
not
have it to the degree required. If this property is a necessary
condition for moral status, its absence in other objects will be a
sufficient condition for denying moral status to them; while if it is
only a sufficient condition, it must be lacking in other objects, and
they must have no other properties in addition which are sufficient
conditions for being ascribed moral status."

Rupert the skirt-boy wrote:
On Jul 16, 2:39 pm, Rudy Canoza wrote:
Rupert the skirt-boy wrote:
On Jul 16, 8:53 am, Rudy Canoza wrote:
Rupert the skirt-boy wrote:
On Jul 16, 1:48 am, Rudy Canoza wrote:
Rupert the skirt-boy wrote:
On Jul 15, 5:19 pm, Rudy Canoza wrote:
Rupert the skirt-boy wrote:
On Jul 15, 11:15 am, Rudy Canoza wrote:
Rupert the skirt-boy blabbered:
On Jul 15, 12:20 am, Rudy Canoza wrote:
Rupert the skirt-boy blabbered:
In this post he seems to want to construct this narrative where he is
the dominant male and I am the submissive female
rupie, your utter lack of talent as a psychoanalyst is
exceeded only by your pomposity.
I don't need any talent
And, the lord or someone granted you just that.
Not very well expressed.
Well enough, skirt-boy.
Well enough to achieve what?
Well enough to demonstrate that you're talentless.
And you say I have "strange tastes" because
Because you do have.
So it's strange to find humour in
You don't find any humor in it, rupie. You've been
taking a teeth-kicking for over two years, and you know
it.

Classic. Just classic.

Okay.


Your fundamental proposition has been denied and
you haven't been able to respond. You're cooked.

I've given my argument yet again and

You can't support your fundamental assertion. It is
not an axiom, queer rupie, even though you want to
treat it as one. You must support your assertion, and
you can't.

Rupert the skirt-boy wrote:
On Jul 15, 5:20 pm, Rudy Canoza wrote:
Rupert the skirt-boy wrote:
On Jul 15, 11:16 am, Rudy Canoza wrote:
Rupert the skirt-boy wrote:
On Jul 15, 4:07 am, Dutch wrote:
Rupert the skirt-boy wrote:
On Jul 13, 10:25 pm, "pearl" wrote:
"Rupert" wrote in glegroups.com...
On Jul 10, 4:59 pm, Rudy Canoza wrote:
Dutch wrote:
..
You earn every bit of verbal abuse you get, and then some.
That is exactly right.
In the eyes of any decent person who reads these conversations, it's
an utter absurdity.
It is the typical "he/she asked for it" refrain of all abusers.
Seems Ball feminizes male opponents, as he's tried with you,
because more than men, he hates and likes to attack women.
In this post he seems to want to construct this narrative where he is
the dominant male and I am the submissive female and I get masochistic
gratification from yielding to him. A bit more information about his
sexual psyche than we need to know, I think.
http://groups.google.com/group/talk....g/89988189a95b...
However you protest, you obviously revel in it, you're perpetuating it.- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
Yes, I find it extremely funny
No, you narcissistic little skirt-boy. You /revel/ in
it because you're in love with yourself.
No, I'm afraid not,
It's the truth. You revel in it because you're a sick
narcissistic **** who craves the attention. Sick.


I don't know to what extent exactly you're aware of this, if at
all, but

You're a windy, wheezy son of a ****, in addition to
being a sick narcissist who craves whatever attention
you can get.

Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 7:31 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your criticisms
of it are unsatisfactory.
Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a
convincing argument.
There's more to it than that. I've elaborated on why the burden of
proof lies where I claim it does.
You've done no such thing. You (and DeGrazia) can't support your
assertions so you attempt to force others to supply proof of the
contrary, its the oldest trick in the book. If you expect for one single
moment that such a tactic is going to meet with any success you are
dreaming. All it does is show to everyone that your position cannot be
argued on its merits.


I've explained exactly why the burden of proof lies where it does.

Everyone who proposes a point of view has an opportunity and an
obligation to provide supporting arguments for that view, if they hope
to persuade anyone that their point of view is worthwhile. Simply
shifting the entire burden to the other side is lazy and indicative of a
failed position.

Those who judge two different cases differently have to supply a
morally relevant difference between the two cases. The burden is on
them to show that the morally relevant difference exists.

Moralstat99 does just that, systematically and convincingly. It is
argued that "sentience" (including advanced intelligence) is the key
determinant for attributing moral significance to organisms, and that
rather than their being simply two categories, humans and animals, as
your argument implies, there are actually a plethora of levels of
sentience, humans being the highest, followed by great apes, other
mammals, birds, fish, and on down to insects, microscopic organisms and
plants. Moral significance is assigned according to the degree of
sentience possessed by each species. This explains the normal view of
humans and animals and it even accounts for the way you explain *your*
attitude towards the animals you kill in you daily life.

If this
weren't so, there would have been no way to argue for the emancipation
of black people.

Emancipation succeeded because advocates correctly argued out that there
is no difference in "sentience" (including advanced intelligence)
between white people and black people. Proponents of slavery had no
valid response. Those who argue that animals and humans should receive
equal consideration cannot make the argument that animals and humans
possess equal sentience, that is why you resort to shifting the burden.

The author of the essay you admire so much, and every
other serious scholar in animal ethics, would agree with me.

You should learn to avoid this little fallacy, it makes you look silly.

Those who
want to argue that being human gives you a special moral status have
to explain why. Some think it can be done, some can't.

I just did it, re-read moralstat99. It is based on "sentience"
(including advanced intelligence). The actions of every human, including
you, confirms the correctness of this very intuitive conclusion.

To say DeGrazia does not support his assertions is palpable nonsense.
As you said to Derek, you're not evaluating the text honestly.

He goes to great lengths to support his contention that his opponents
have the burden of proof. As I stated, that is not the same as making a
positive argument for one's position.


You can deny it all you want, but there's an argument here that has to
be seriously engaged with, and none of you are doing that.

You can deny it all you want, but there is *no* argument left that has
not been adequately dealt with, and if you were not so heavily
emotionally invested in your "Animal Liberation" agenda you might be
able to see that.


Ball's alternative account of where
the burden of proof lies has serious problems, which I have explained.
He has given no satisfactory response.
I've provided a coherent point of view which refutes the argument from
marginal cases. It lays out a solid foundation which explains rights and
our relationship with animals.

You've given someone else's attempted rebuttal of the argument from
marginal cases, which we've talked about a bit and we'll talk about
some more.

The only thing left for you to say is that moralstat99 thoroughly and
convincingly refutes the Argument from Marginal Cases, one of the
fundamental pillars of the Animal Rights movement. The good news is,
Rupert, life goes on, the sun will still shine, brighter in the light of
reason.

Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 7:31 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your
criticisms
of it are unsatisfactory.
Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a
convincing argument.
There's more to it than that. I've elaborated on why the burden of
proof lies where I claim it does.
You've done no such thing. You (and DeGrazia) can't support your
assertions so you attempt to force others to supply proof of the
contrary, its the oldest trick in the book. If you expect for one single
moment that such a tactic is going to meet with any success you are
dreaming. All it does is show to everyone that your position cannot be
argued on its merits.


I've explained exactly why the burden of proof lies where it does.

Everyone who proposes a point of view has an opportunity and an
obligation to provide supporting arguments for that view, if they hope
to persuade anyone that their point of view is worthwhile. Simply
shifting the entire burden to the other side is lazy and indicative of a
failed position.

By now, it's apparent the "ar" side can't support their
fundamental proposition, and thus don't even bother to
try. The dishonesty comes in acting as if the
proposition is proved, and generally accepted; an
axiom, in other words. It is not.

Good other points below.


Those who judge two different cases differently have to supply a
morally relevant difference between the two cases. The burden is on
them to show that the morally relevant difference exists.

Moralstat99 does just that, systematically and convincingly. It is
argued that "sentience" (including advanced intelligence) is the key
determinant for attributing moral significance to organisms, and that
rather than their being simply two categories, humans and animals, as
your argument implies, there are actually a plethora of levels of
sentience, humans being the highest, followed by great apes, other
mammals, birds, fish, and on down to insects, microscopic organisms and
plants. Moral significance is assigned according to the degree of
sentience possessed by each species. This explains the normal view of
humans and animals and it even accounts for the way you explain *your*
attitude towards the animals you kill in you daily life.

If this
weren't so, there would have been no way to argue for the emancipation
of black people.

Emancipation succeeded because advocates correctly argued out that there
is no difference in "sentience" (including advanced intelligence)
between white people and black people. Proponents of slavery had no
valid response. Those who argue that animals and humans should receive
equal consideration cannot make the argument that animals and humans
possess equal sentience, that is why you resort to shifting the burden.

The author of the essay you admire so much, and every
other serious scholar in animal ethics, would agree with me.

You should learn to avoid this little fallacy, it makes you look silly.

Those who
want to argue that being human gives you a special moral status have
to explain why. Some think it can be done, some can't.

I just did it, re-read moralstat99. It is based on "sentience"
(including advanced intelligence). The actions of every human, including
you, confirms the correctness of this very intuitive conclusion.

To say DeGrazia does not support his assertions is palpable nonsense.
As you said to Derek, you're not evaluating the text honestly.

He goes to great lengths to support his contention that his opponents
have the burden of proof. As I stated, that is not the same as making a
positive argument for one's position.


You can deny it all you want, but there's an argument here that has to
be seriously engaged with, and none of you are doing that.

You can deny it all you want, but there is *no* argument left that has
not been adequately dealt with, and if you were not so heavily
emotionally invested in your "Animal Liberation" agenda you might be
able to see that.


Ball's alternative account of where
the burden of proof lies has serious problems, which I have explained.
He has given no satisfactory response.
I've provided a coherent point of view which refutes the argument from
marginal cases. It lays out a solid foundation which explains rights and
our relationship with animals.

You've given someone else's attempted rebuttal of the argument from
marginal cases, which we've talked about a bit and we'll talk about
some more.

The only thing left for you to say is that moralstat99 thoroughly and
convincingly refutes the Argument from Marginal Cases, one of the
fundamental pillars of the Animal Rights movement. The good news is,
Rupert, life goes on, the sun will still shine, brighter in the light of
reason.

Rupert the lying skirt-boy wrote:
On Jul 16, 7:31 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your criticisms
of it are unsatisfactory.
Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a
convincing argument.
There's more to it than that. I've elaborated on why the burden of
proof lies where I claim it does.
You've done no such thing. You (and DeGrazia) can't support your
assertions so you attempt to force others to supply proof of the
contrary, its the oldest trick in the book. If you expect for one single
moment that such a tactic is going to meet with any success you are
dreaming. All it does is show to everyone that your position cannot be
argued on its merits.


I've explained exactly why the burden of proof lies where it does.

You haven't, rupie. You have merely, and emptily,
asserted where it lies. You are wrong. The burden of
supporting your claim that animals are due equal moral
consideration lies on YOU and your other failure
"aras". We know you can't meet it.

Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 7:37 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your criticisms
of it are unsatisfactory.
Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a
convincing argument.
I would also add that that essay, moralstat99.doc, which you like so
much, endorses this argument of mine. I showed where in the thread
"The myth of food production efficiency...", in conversation with Ball.
Are you referring to the suggestion that we may have a prima facie moral
obligation to consume a vegetarian diet?

No, of course not. Here is the quote.

Thank you

"When we affirm that some objects have inherent value while others do
not, we treat them differently with regard to moral status. If this
differential treatment is to be sound and not arbitrary, it must be
justifiable by some relevant difference. This requirement is
warranted
by the Principle of Formal Equality which can hardly be avoided if we
are to think consistently in practical matters. Presumably, the best
way of formulating this principle is as follows: Cases which are
relevantly similar, should be treated in a similar manner; a
differential treatment requires a relevant difference.


Applied to the question of moral status, this should be spelled out
as
follows: If we ascribe moral status to some objects and not to
others,
the first objects must have some relevant property to the required
degree, and the other objects must lack this property, or at least
not
have it to the degree required. If this property is a necessary
condition for moral status, its absence in other objects will be a
sufficient condition for denying moral status to them; while if it is
only a sufficient condition, it must be lacking in other objects, and
they must have no other properties in addition which are sufficient
conditions for being ascribed moral status."

The author goes on to lay the groundwork for his conclusion 14 pages
later, on page 20, as follows:

"The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings, which
can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription of
moral status. Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably
the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is accepted
to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status, then its
absence in other animals will be a sufficient condition for denying
moral status to them."

Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your criticisms
of it are unsatisfactory.
Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a
convincing argument.


There's more to it than that. I've elaborated on why the burden of
proof lies where I claim it does.

It was empty bluster, rupie.


Rudy's alternative account of where
the burden of proof lies has serious problems,

No.

Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 2:39 pm, Rudy Canoza wrote:
Rupert the skirt-boy wrote:
On Jul 16, 8:53 am, Rudy Canoza wrote:
Rupert the skirt-boy wrote:
On Jul 16, 1:48 am, Rudy Canoza wrote:
Rupert the skirt-boy wrote:
On Jul 15, 5:19 pm, Rudy Canoza wrote:
Rupert the skirt-boy wrote:
On Jul 15, 11:15 am, Rudy Canoza wrote:
Rupert the skirt-boy blabbered:
On Jul 15, 12:20 am, Rudy Canoza wrote:
Rupert the skirt-boy blabbered:
In this post he seems to want to construct this narrative where he is
the dominant male and I am the submissive female
rupie, your utter lack of talent as a psychoanalyst is
exceeded only by your pomposity.
I don't need any talent
And, the lord or someone granted you just that.
Not very well expressed.
Well enough, skirt-boy.
Well enough to achieve what?
Well enough to demonstrate that you're talentless.
And you say I have "strange tastes" because
Because you do have.
So it's strange to find humour in
You don't find any humor in it, rupie. You've been
taking a teeth-kicking for over two years, and you know
it.

Your fundamental proposition has been denied and
you haven't been able to respond. You're cooked.

I've given my argument yet again

You've made more empty and unsupported assertions yet
again, you mean.


and demonstrated that your criticisms
of it are unsatisfactory.

You've demonstrated no such thing. You keep piling
unsupported assertions atop the others; that last was
another.

On Mon, 16 Jul 2007 20:00:10 GMT, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 7:37 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:

I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your
criticisms of it are unsatisfactory.

Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a
convincing argument.

I would also add that that essay, moralstat99.doc, which you like so
much, endorses this argument of mine. I showed where in the thread
"The myth of food production efficiency...", in conversation with Ball.

Are you referring to the suggestion that we may have a prima facie moral
obligation to consume a vegetarian diet?

No, of course not. Here is the quote.

Thank you

"When we affirm that some objects have inherent value while others
do not, we treat them differently with regard to moral status. If this
differential treatment is to be sound and not arbitrary, it must be
justifiable by some relevant difference. This requirement is warranted
by the Principle of Formal Equality which can hardly be avoided if we
are to think consistently in practical matters. Presumably, the best
way of formulating this principle is as follows: Cases which are
relevantly similar, should be treated in a similar manner; a
differential treatment requires a relevant difference.

Applied to the question of moral status, this should be spelled out as
follows: If we ascribe moral status to some objects and not to others,
the first objects must have some relevant property to the required
degree, and the other objects must lack this property, or at least
not have it to the degree required. If this property is a necessary
condition for moral status, its absence in other objects will be a
sufficient condition for denying moral status to them; while if it is
only a sufficient condition, it must be lacking in other objects, and
they must have no other properties in addition which are sufficient
conditions for being ascribed moral status."

The author goes on to lay the groundwork for his conclusion

By denying the antecedent, no less.

14 pages later, on page 20, as follows:

"The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings, which
can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription of
moral status.

Ipse dixit and false. The author must define what this "relevant
differences" is, AND that it justifies disrespectful treatment.

Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably
the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is accepted
to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status,

1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have
moral status.

then its absence in other animals

2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency

will be a sufficient condition for denying moral status to them."

Therefore (3) they have no moral status.

Any argument that denies the antecedent to gain acceptance
must always be rejected as specious.

1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have
moral status.
2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency
therefore
3) they have no moral status.

or

1) If a, then c
2) Not a
therefore
3) not c

irate vegan wrote:
On Mon, 16 Jul 2007 20:00:10 GMT, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 7:37 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your
criticisms of it are unsatisfactory.
Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a
convincing argument.
I would also add that that essay, moralstat99.doc, which you like so
much, endorses this argument of mine. I showed where in the thread
"The myth of food production efficiency...", in conversation with Ball.
Are you referring to the suggestion that we may have a prima facie moral
obligation to consume a vegetarian diet?
No, of course not. Here is the quote.
Thank you

"When we affirm that some objects have inherent value while others
do not, we treat them differently with regard to moral status. If this
differential treatment is to be sound and not arbitrary, it must be
justifiable by some relevant difference. This requirement is warranted
by the Principle of Formal Equality which can hardly be avoided if we
are to think consistently in practical matters. Presumably, the best
way of formulating this principle is as follows: Cases which are
relevantly similar, should be treated in a similar manner; a
differential treatment requires a relevant difference.

Applied to the question of moral status, this should be spelled out as
follows: If we ascribe moral status to some objects and not to others,
the first objects must have some relevant property to the required
degree, and the other objects must lack this property, or at least
not have it to the degree required. If this property is a necessary
condition for moral status, its absence in other objects will be a
sufficient condition for denying moral status to them; while if it is
only a sufficient condition, it must be lacking in other objects, and
they must have no other properties in addition which are sufficient
conditions for being ascribed moral status."
The author goes on to lay the groundwork for his conclusion

By denying the antecedent, no less.

14 pages later, on page 20, as follows:

"The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings, which
can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription of
moral status.

Ipse dixit and false. The author must define what this "relevant
differences" is, AND that it justifies disrespectful treatment.

Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably
the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is accepted
to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status,

1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have
moral status.

then its absence in other animals

2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency

will be a sufficient condition for denying moral status to them."

Therefore (3) they have no moral status.

Any argument that denies the antecedent to gain acceptance
must always be rejected as specious.

1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have
moral status.
2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency
therefore
3) they have no moral status.

or

1) If a, then c
2) Not a
therefore
3) not c

All bullshit. Moral agency and moral status are not one and the same.
The capacity for moral agency is the basis for full moral status.

On Tue, 17 Jul 2007 01:23:12 GMT, Dutch wrote:
irate vegan wrote:
On Mon, 16 Jul 2007 20:00:10 GMT, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 7:37 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:

I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your
criticisms of it are unsatisfactory.

Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a
convincing argument.

I would also add that that essay, moralstat99.doc, which you like so
much, endorses this argument of mine. I showed where in the thread
"The myth of food production efficiency...", in conversation with Ball.

Are you referring to the suggestion that we may have a prima facie moral
obligation to consume a vegetarian diet?

No, of course not. Here is the quote.
"When we affirm that some objects have inherent value while others
do not, we treat them differently with regard to moral status. If this
differential treatment is to be sound and not arbitrary, it must be
justifiable by some relevant difference. This requirement is warranted
by the Principle of Formal Equality which can hardly be avoided if we
are to think consistently in practical matters. Presumably, the best
way of formulating this principle is as follows: Cases which are
relevantly similar, should be treated in a similar manner; a
differential treatment requires a relevant difference.

Applied to the question of moral status, this should be spelled out as
follows: If we ascribe moral status to some objects and not to others,
the first objects must have some relevant property to the required
degree, and the other objects must lack this property, or at least
not have it to the degree required. If this property is a necessary
condition for moral status, its absence in other objects will be a
sufficient condition for denying moral status to them; while if it is
only a sufficient condition, it must be lacking in other objects, and
they must have no other properties in addition which are sufficient
conditions for being ascribed moral status."

The author goes on to lay the groundwork for his conclusion

By denying the antecedent, no less.

Exactly right.

14 pages later, on page 20, as follows:

"The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings, which
can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription of
moral status.

Ipse dixit and false. The author must define what this "relevant
differences" is, AND that it justifies disrespectful treatment.

Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably
the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is accepted
to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status,

1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have
moral status.

then its absence in other animals

2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency

will be a sufficient condition for denying moral status to them."

Therefore (3) they have no moral status.

Any argument that denies the antecedent to gain acceptance
must always be rejected as specious.

1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have
moral status.
2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency
therefore
3) they have no moral status.

or

1) If a, then c
2) Not a
therefore
3) not c

All bullshit.

No, it's a simple syllogism to show where the author denies
the antecedent to get his point accepted.

Moral agency and moral status are not one and the same.

I'm not saying they are. What I'm saying is that a lack of
moral agency doesn't show a lack of moral status. Beings
can still have moral status without having moral agency.
The author concedes this by writing,

"Theoretically, there might be other moral persons also,
but there seem to be none, excepting perhaps some of
our closest relatives among the primates."

I then wrote,

"It follows, then, that apes hold rights due to his fact that
they "are moral persons.""

and you replied,

"Possibly. I would hold in fact that this is so plausible that
apes should be granted basic rights."
Dutch 7 July 2007 http://tinyurl.com/328k8h

The capacity for moral agency is the basis for full moral status.

You've moved the goalposts from "moral status" to "full moral
status", but that effort still doesn't explain how a lack in moral
agency demonstrates a lack in moral status.

"Animals can be "moral patients", in a similar
way as minor children or people in comas.
They can hold rights against us, but we can't
hold rights against them."
Dutch 24 Sep 2005 http://tinyurl.com/cpxhx

On Tue, 17 Jul 2007 10:07:32 +0100, irate vegan
wrote:

On Tue, 17 Jul 2007 01:23:12 GMT, Dutch wrote:
irate vegan wrote:
On Mon, 16 Jul 2007 20:00:10 GMT, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 7:37 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:
On Jul 16, 4:15 pm, Dutch wrote:
Rupert wrote:

I've given my argument yet again and demonstrated that your
criticisms of it are unsatisfactory.

Stating that your opponents must disprove your assertions is not a
convincing argument.

I would also add that that essay, moralstat99.doc, which you like so
much, endorses this argument of mine. I showed where in the thread
"The myth of food production efficiency...", in conversation with Ball.

Are you referring to the suggestion that we may have a prima facie moral
obligation to consume a vegetarian diet?

No, of course not. Here is the quote.
"When we affirm that some objects have inherent value while others
do not, we treat them differently with regard to moral status. If this
differential treatment is to be sound and not arbitrary, it must be
justifiable by some relevant difference. This requirement is warranted
by the Principle of Formal Equality which can hardly be avoided if we
are to think consistently in practical matters. Presumably, the best
way of formulating this principle is as follows: Cases which are
relevantly similar, should be treated in a similar manner; a
differential treatment requires a relevant difference.

Applied to the question of moral status, this should be spelled out as
follows: If we ascribe moral status to some objects and not to others,
the first objects must have some relevant property to the required
degree, and the other objects must lack this property, or at least
not have it to the degree required. If this property is a necessary
condition for moral status, its absence in other objects will be a
sufficient condition for denying moral status to them; while if it is
only a sufficient condition, it must be lacking in other objects, and
they must have no other properties in addition which are sufficient
conditions for being ascribed moral status."

The author goes on to lay the groundwork for his conclusion

By denying the antecedent, no less.

Exactly right.

No, exactly wrong, grossly incorrect. The groundwork is rigorous
philosophical argument.

14 pages later, on page 20, as follows:

"The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings, which
can justify a differential treatment with regard to the ascription of
moral status.

Ipse dixit and false. The author must define what this "relevant
differences" is, AND that it justifies disrespectful treatment.

Humans have a property which other animals lack, notably
the capability of being moral agents, and if this property is accepted
to be a necessary condition for the ascription of moral status,

1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have
moral status.

then its absence in other animals

2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency

will be a sufficient condition for denying moral status to them."

Therefore (3) they have no moral status.

Any argument that denies the antecedent to gain acceptance
must always be rejected as specious.

1) If animals have the capacity of moral agency, then they have
moral status.
2) Animals don't have the capacity of moral agency
therefore
3) they have no moral status.

or

1) If a, then c
2) Not a
therefore
3) not c

All bullshit.

No, it's a simple syllogism to show where the author denies
the antecedent to get his point accepted.

He doesn't, you're completely off the rails. He states that the
capacity for moral agency is what sets humans apart from all other
species, and that capacity is what entitles humans to special moral
status.


Moral agency and moral status are not one and the same.

I'm not saying they are.

You're barking up the wrong tree.

What I'm saying is that a lack of
moral agency doesn't show a lack of moral status.

He doesn't say that it does.

Beings
can still have moral status without having moral agency.
The author concedes this by writing,

Of course he concedes it. You just erected a strawman and attacked it.


"Theoretically, there might be other moral persons also,
but there seem to be none, excepting perhaps some of
our closest relatives among the primates."

I then wrote,

"It follows, then, that apes hold rights due to his fact that
they "are moral persons.""

and you replied,

"Possibly. I would hold in fact that this is so plausible that
apes should be granted basic rights."
Dutch 7 July 2007 http://tinyurl.com/328k8h

Yes, all reasonable..


The capacity for moral agency is the basis for full moral status.

You've moved the goalposts from "moral status" to "full moral
status"

I haven't moved the goalposts, I have always held that animals possess
moral status. In moralstat99 he argues that all organisms possess some
moral status depending on the degree of sentience of the species.
Humans, with the highest degree of sentience/intelligence enjoy the
highest moral status. Microscopic animals with the lowest, enjoy the
least. This is a completely plausible idea.

but that effort still doesn't explain how a lack in moral
agency demonstrates a lack in moral status.

The capacity for moral agency is the high water mark of sentience, it
is a part of the set of higher cognitive functions which set humans
apart from all other species.


"Animals can be "moral patients", in a similar
way as minor children or people in comas.
They can hold rights against us, but we can't
hold rights against them."
Dutch 24 Sep 2005 http://tinyurl.com/cpxhx

I'm going to tell you this once, stop the nonsense of dragging up
quotes from years ago or I'll just ignore you. I don't have the
patience to indulge your rubbish. If you are incapable of carrying on
a contemporaneous discussion then signal that by continuing the
practice and I'll just killfile you and your sock puppets.